

1.) TELEGRAM IN CODE (G. Ch. V.)
Foreign Office, Berlin.
No. ____ of February 1943

To the Foreign Minister.

From conversations which I had recently with the Prime Minister, Ministers of the Navy, Chiefs of the Naval Staff and of the General Staff, with Ministers Aoki and Suzuki, etc. I gained the following overall impression:

All parties stressed their firm conviction in victory and expressed the desire for the closest possible cooperation with Germany, as well as their complete confidence in the accomplishments of our Armed Forces and those of our people. The necessity and importance of direct contact between Japan and Germany in any manner possible was stressed and that this be given special prominence in view of the propaganda effect on our enemies. All visits were extremely cordial and personal, lasting longer than was originally planned.

Prime Minister Tojo stated that he was not concerned by the situation in Russia. He was convinced of the ultimate victory of German arms. At the moment he was particularly interested in the situation in North Africa, Turkey and Spain. He would be grateful for bulletins on all important events and would also be prepared to give us any information whatever quite freely. The war at present is a war of weapons and nerves, and the closest cooperation possible is absolutely essential, particularly in retrospect to enemy propaganda which seeks to use all possible means to weaken Japanese-German friendship. In this connection he mentions neutral diplomats who were spreading false and damaging rumors. The Prime Minister then discussed the Chinese situation with me and requested that we continue these discussions in the future. I request your approval of this.

Prime Minister Tojo who as Minister of War played an important role in the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, is unquestionably the strongest personality in the Japanese Cabinet, thanks to his leadership abilities. Despite these characteristics and his popularity with the people he has been attacked several times (See Telegram No. 478 as of 6.2). This is due to the unique existing circumstances. Previous centuries of vague representations of the Emperor as a purely spiritual figure led to the belief, since the Meiji Restoration, in comparatively frequent changes of government, so that no outstanding predominating character could in any wise assume the aspects of the Emperor. Under these circumstances it is not inconceivable that Tojo even if his policies are

approved of at present may have to withdraw after a given time. Such a withdrawal would be regrettable from the German point of view, since Tojo, as described above, is a dynamic personality and an outspoken friend of Germany. On the other hand the change in government would not affect the Japanese policy under the Tripartite agreement since it is universally recognized here that Japan's fate is bound up with the Axis Powers.

STAHLER

Doc. 1230-2

P1

1. 陸 軍 電 報 (通 信 式)

伯 林 ・ 外 務 省 ・

一 九 四 三 年 二 月 第 一 號

外 務 大 臣 宛

最 近 ハ 首 相 海 軍 大 臣 ・ 軍 令 部 總 長 ・ 參 謀 總 長 ・ 青
木 ・ 鈴 木 各 大 臣 等 ト ナ シ タ ル 有 談 ヨ リ 余 ハ 次 ノ 全
般 的 印 象 ラ 得 タ リ 。

全 員 其 ノ 必 勝 ノ 信 念 ラ 強 固 シ ・ 獨 逸 ト 出 來 得 ル 限
リ 最 モ 緊 密 ナ ル 協 力 ニ 對 ス ル 希 望 並 ニ 我 ガ 軍 及 ビ
我 ガ 國 民 ノ 威 果 ニ 對 ス ル ソ ノ 完 全 ナ ル 確 信 ラ 表 明
セ リ ・ ア ラ ュ ル 出 來 ル 限 リ ノ 方 法 ラ 以 テ ス ル 日 獨
逸 ノ 直 接 提 携 ノ 必 要 並 ニ 重 要 性 カ 強 固 サ レ 又 ・ 我
等 ノ 敵 ニ 對 ス ル 宣 傳 效 果 ニ 鑑 ミ ・ 是 ラ 特 ニ 重 視 ス
ベ キ コ ト カ 強 固 セ ラ レ タ リ 。

訪 問 ハ ・ 總 ベ テ 祝 メ テ 心 カ ラ ナ ル 打 解 ケ タ ル モ ノ
ニ シ テ ・ 最 初 ノ 訪 問 ヨ リ 長 ク 続 キ タ リ 。

東 條 首 相 ハ 露 西 盟 ニ 於 ケ ル 狀 勢 ラ 心 配 シ 居 ラ ズ ト
述 ベ タ リ ・ ソ ノ 際 彼 ハ 北 「 ア フ リ カ 」 土 耳 古 及 ビ
西 班 牙 ノ 狀 勢 ニ 特 ニ 關 心 ラ 持 ツ ・ 假 ハ ム ュ ル 重 大
ナ ル 出 來 事 ニ 關 ス ル 報 告 ラ 懇 請 ス ベ ク 又 如 何 ナ ル
情 報 ラ モ 全 ク 自 由 ニ 我 々 ニ 與 ヘ ル 用 意 ア ル ベ シ 。

現 在 ノ 戰 争 ハ 武 益 並 ニ 經 經 戰 争 ニ シ テ 出 來 得 ル 限

None. 1230-C

P. 2.

リノ坂モ察宿ナル協力ガ、特ニ、日獨ノ友誼ヲ願
メルタメ凡ユル手長ヲ用イストスル願ノ宣傳ニ願
ミ、絶休ニ必要ナリ。之ニ歸屬シテ、彼ハ虛偽ニ
シテ有害ナル流言ヲ放チ居ル中立國ノ外交官達懸
ダ。首相ハ次イテ余ト中立狀勢ヲ論ジ、ソシテ我
々ガ將來此等ノ智謀ヲ離脱スル確望セリ。
余ハ是ニ對スル御承認ヲ乞フ。
(以下次頁へ續ク)

Dec. 1230

陸相トシテ三國同盟ノ締結ニ重要ナル役割ヲ果セル
東條首相ハ、其ノ統御能力ニ依リ、疑セナク日本ノ
内閣ニ於ケル最モ強力ナ人物ナリ。是等ノ持臂及ビ
國民ニ對スル人氣ニモ拘ラズ、彼ハ屢々攻撃サレタ
リ（六月二日附電報第四七八號参照）。是ハ特異ノ
現存ノ狀況ニ依ル。數世紀來ノ天皇ヲ全ク現神トシ
テ象徵セル事ガ、明治維新以來如何ニ顯著ナル趨勢
家モ比較的頻索ナル政府ノ交送ヲ良シトスル信念ヲ
生ジタリ。決シテ天皇ノ遺相ヲ取り得ザル爲ニ新カ
ル事情ノ許ニハ東條ハ、其ノ政策ハ現在承認セラレ
居ルトハ云ヘ、一定期間後ニハ、挂冠スルヲ要スベ
キ事ハ想像シ得ザル事ニアラズ。斯カル挂冠ハ、前
述ノ如ク東條ハ原動力的人物ニシテ且ツ又獨逸ノ隔
意ナキ友ナルニ依リ、獨逸側ヨリ見レバ、遺憾ナル
コトナルベシ。他方、政權ノ更迭ハ、日本ノ運命ハ
樞軸諸國ト結バレ居ルコトガ當地ニテハ一般ニ承認
サレ居ルニ依リ、三國條約下ニ於ケル日本ノ政策ニ
ハ影響ヲ及ボサザルベシ。

「スターマ」

Telegram in Code
To Tokyo 7. 9.44 08:00
Citissimo
Embassy Tokyo
2028 of 6.9.44
Disclosure B
Very Secret

Exclusively to the Ambassador personally on your Telegrams
2325 of August 25
2347 of August 28

Japanese suggestion for separate peace with Russia.
4) Following the conversation concerning these military questions OSHIMA brought up the Japanese suggestion of a separate peace between Germany and The Soviet Union and needs the same as in the form that Shigemitsu made to you. He underlined hereby that the Japanese Government had in no way contacted the Soviet Union as concerns the possibility of a separate peace, as this could be attributed to us as a sign of weakness. The Japanese government is furthermore determined to continue the war under all circumstance on the side of Germany, until final victory has been achieved. Moreover, the Red Army has now arrived at the borders of 1940, will probably occupy Finland and the Sea Narrows soon, and as the Soviet Union must now think in terms of reconstruction the Japanese government deems it not impossible, that Stalin may be prepared to give in now.

The "Fuhrer" has presented our standpoint following these suggestions which I have gathered as follows, at the conclusion of the discussion with the concurrence of the "Fuhrer".

A) We have no indications that the Soviet Union is prepared for an understanding with Germany, according to our opinion Stalin will only then attempt to come to an understanding when he has convinced himself that he no longer can fight successfully or that his strength does not in any case suffice to beat Germany.

B) When these preconclusions take place by Stalin, this will be shown, then a new political situation will have arrived and then it would be time to see what to do about it.

C) For this reason we ask the Japanese Government, to refrain from taking steps of any kind in this connection with the Soviet Union.

Oshima declared to this that the Japanese Government would take no steps in this direction without our concurrence. On his question whether we had changed our war aim toward the Soviet Union, the "Fuhrer" answered that "when a state falls apart therewith everything falls apart. The Infantry of the Soviet Union is bad and when once the entire

structure of the Soviet Union begins to totter, then everything will fall apart, as happens again and again among the Slavs. Stalin did not capitulate when we stood at the Don, the same now holds true for Germany. The Carthaginians stood before Rome once, but the Romans did not capitulate and finally dragged a ploughshare over Carthage. When again we would go on the offensive against the Red Army cannot be said at the moment. But we cannot be on the defensive on all fronts at the same time. Oshima declared once more that Japan would fight on the side of Germany until final victory had been achieved and that it would use its last troops to realize this, as there is only one road for Japan, which it will follow to the end. The "Fuehrer" closed the conversation then with assurance that the same will for fight and victory remained also with the Germans and that with such determination of the two powers victory must be theirs.

Von Ribbentrop

Doc. 1230-D

一二三〇D

暗號電報

東京宛四四年九月七日、八時〇分

最大至急

東京大使館

四四年九月六日附第二〇二八號

密級 B

極秘

貴下電報ニ關シ大使宛親展

八月二十五日附第二三二五號

八月二十八日附第二三四七號

「ロシヤ」トノ單獨講和ニ對スル日本ノ提案

四、是等ノ單邊問題ニ關スル會談ニ引續キ大島ハ獨謀ノ單獨講和ニ

關スル日本側提案ヲ提出シ、重光ガ貴下ニ爲シタト同シ形式ニ

テ………………。彼ハ、コレニ依ツテ、日本政府ハ、單

獨講和ノ可能性ニ關シテハコレハ、我々ノ側ニ關聯ノアル該左

ト考ヘラルルヲ以テ齟齬ト全然接觸シ居ラザル旨力説セリ。

日本ハ更ニ、最後ノ勝利ヲ得ル迄ハ、無條件ニ立テ、アラユル

情勢下ニ於イテ戦争ヲ繼續スル意ヲ有ス。尙又赤軍ハ今ヤ一九

四〇年ノ國境ニ達シ、恐ラクハ日ナラズシテ「フィンランド」

及ビ海峽ヲ占領スベク、故ニ存続ハ今ヤ再建ヲ考ヘザルベカラ

ザルニ依リ日本政府ハ「スターリン」ガ目下屬服スル用意アル

ヤモ知レザルコトハ不可能ナラズト思考ス。

2202. 1230-1

P. 2.

總統ハコレ等ノ提案ニ次イデ、討議終了ノ際、總統ノ同意ヲ得テ余ガ次ギノ通り推斷セル我々ノ立場ヲ陳述セリ。

(1) 我々ハ蘇聯ハ獨逸ト了辦ノ用意アリトノ徵候ヲ認メズ、我々ノ見ル所ニ依レバ、「スターリン」

ハ彼ハ最早有利ニ蘇フコト能ハスヲハ彼ノ力ハ獨逸ヲ敵ルニ次シテ充分ナラスト確信セル時ニ至リ始メテ了辦ニ到達セント試ムベシ。

(ロ) 此等ノ陳述ガ「スターリン」ニ起ル場合ハ、是ヲ示スベシ。ソノ時ハ我々ソノ政治狀勢ガ到來シ居ルベク、又ソノ時ハ之ニ處キ如何ニ處スベキカラ見ルベキ時ナルベシ。

(ハ) コレ故ニ、我々ハ日本政權ニ對シコシニ關連シテ如何ナル種類ノ手段モ採ラザル様要請ス。

大島ハ、此レニ對シテ、日本政府ハ、我々ノ同意ナクバ此ノ方面ニハ何等ノ指針モ執ラザルベシト聲明セリ。我々ハ對蘇聯軍目的ヲ變更セシヤ否ヤトノ彼ノ質問ニ、總統ハ、國家ガ分裂スル時ハソレト共ニ一切ガ分裂ス、否ハタリ、

蘇聯ノ歩兵ハ惡シク、而シテ一度ヒ蘇聯ノ全軍成カ
 グラツキ始ムレバ、ソノ時ハ、「スラヴ」民族同ニ
 再三起ル如クアラユルモノハ、分裂スベシ。
 「スターリン」ハ我々ガ「ドン」河ニ立チシ際ニハ
 降セザリキ、今ヤ獨逸モ同様ナリ。「カルタゴ」軍
 ハ、一度ハ「ローマ」ヲ指呼ノ間ニ至ミタルモ、「
 ローマ」人ハ降伏セズ、遂ニハ「カルタゴ」ヲ屈伏
 セシメタリ。何時再ビ我々ガ赤軍ニ對シ攻勢ニ出ヅ
 ルヤハ目下言ヒ得ズ。併シ、我々ハ、同時ニ、全戰
 線ニ於イテ守勢ニ出ヅル能ハズ。大島ハ、重ネテ、
 日本ハ最後ノ勝利ヲ得ル迄ハ獨逸側ニ立チテ戰フベ
 キコト並ニ日本ハ、コレガ實境ノタメ、日本ノ最後
 マデ行クベキ道ハ只一ツノミナルニ依リ最後ノ軍隊
 ヲモ使用スベキコトヲ聲明セリ。
 總統ハ次イデ獨軍ニモ亦戰鬪並ニ勝利ニ對スル同様
 ノ意志殘存シ又兩國ノ斯カル決意ヲ以テスレバ、勝
 利ハ彼等ノモノタルベシトノ確信ヲ以ツテ會談ヲ終
 了シタリ。

「フオン。リツベントロツブ」

Decoded Telegram (G.Ch.V.)
Left Berlin on 13-2-44- 12:30 o'clock
Arr. Tokyo on 14-2-44- 16:00 o'clock
Decoded by: Mayer
Clear copy read by: Mayer
Telegram No. 318 of 13 Feb. 44.
Disclosure C.

For the Ambassador personally.

Ambassador KAWAHARA informed Undersecretary HENCKE of the following on February 8.

(1) In a conference with you in Tokyo on January 24 the Japanese Foreign Minister has expressed, that the Japanese Government deemed it advisable if Germany should undertake the attempt to approach the Soviet Union for an agreement as this would have a favorable result upon the overall situation of the Axis. KAWAHARA asked in this direction on the basis of written material and apparently on advice of his government, that the possession of the Ukraine were no longer necessary for Germany, as we have the opportunity in view of the collapse in Italy, to extend our sphere of power to the Mediterranean, North Africa and the Balkans, without consideration of the Italian interest.

(2) In the mentioned conference between you and the Japanese Foreign Minister, the latter has also mentioned the desire, that Germany, just as Japan has done for the nations of East Asia, should proclaim the national freedom of all those countries occupied by her. Such a declaration according to the opinion of the Ambassador, would be favorable for the axis powers in carrying out the war, and also it would underline the agreement of the Japanese and German war aims as concerns the emancipation of the nations of Europe and Asia.

You have answered the Japanese Foreign Minister, that the German Government agrees with the opinion of the Japanese Foreign Minister on the whole, however, before such a proclamation can be made, the expected allied invasion in the West must have been repulsed. Upon this Mr. SHIGEMITSU has answered that in his opinion it may be too late for such a declaration then.

End of the KAWAHARA speech. As a report from you concerning this conversation with the Foreign Minister has not been received, I beg you for a detailed report concerning the suggestion of SHIGEMITSU as well as of the answers you gave.

VON RIBBENTROP

Doc 1230-1E

Exh. A.

文書第一二三〇號（管轄八〇七）

明譯電報（G. O. H. V.）

ベルリン／Berlin / 發一千九百四十四年二月十三日十二時三十分

東京 着 一千九百四十四年二月十四日十六時

明 譯 者 ーマイヤー / MAYER /

譯 書 作 成 ーマイヤー / MAYER /

發 表 ー 〇 稿

電 信 者 號 ー 千 九 百 四 十 四 年 二 月 十 三 日 第 三 一 八 號

直接大使宛

カワハラ大使 / Ambassador KAWAHARA / 二月八日 次

ノコトラ、ヘンケ / HENCKE / 次官ニ告ゲタ。

(一) 一月二十四日ノ東京ニ於ケル貴下トノ會談ニ於テ

日本外務大臣ハ、次ノ如ク述べタ、即チモシ、獨乙

ガ、ソヴィエト聯邦 / SOVIET UNION / ト協定締

結ノ交渉ヲ試ミルナラバ、極端ニノ全般的地位ニ好

結果ヲ齎ラスト思ウカラ日本政府ハソレハ結構ト思フ。

カワハラ / KAWAHARA / ハ此ノ點ニ關シ、強調ヲ進ニシ

且明カニ本國政府ノ意向ニ達クト思ハレルガ次ノコ

トラ聞フタ。即チ、ドイツハ伊太利ニ於ケル崩壞ニ

鑑ミ、伊太利ノ利益ヲ考慮スルコトナク、ドイツノ

勢力圖ヲ地中海 / MEDITERRANEAN / 北アフリカ / NORTH

AFRICA / 及ビ、バルカン / BALKAN / ニ侵スル意

會ヲ得タノデアルカラ、ウクライナ / UKRAINE /

Doc 1230

(三)

ノ保持ハ、ドイツニトツテ、最早必要デナイノデハ
ナイカハ

貴下ト日本外務大臣トノ右會議ニ於テ、後者ハ又
丁度日本ガ東亞ノ諸國ニ對シテナシタ様ニ、初メヨ
リ占領下ノスベテノ國々ノ國家的自由ヲ宣言サレタ
シトイウ希望ヲ述べタ。

大使ノ意見ニ依レバカ、ル宣言ハ戰争進行上、極自
國ヲ利スルデアラカシ又戰争ノ諸國ノ解放ニ關シテ
ハ、日本及獨乙ノ戰争目的ニ於ケル一障礙ヲ預メス
ルコトモナルノデアラカ。

貴下ハ日本外務大臣ニ初メ政府ハ日本外務大臣ノ意
見ニ大体ニ於テ同意デアルガ、カ、ル宣言ヲナシ得
ルタメニハソレ以前ニ豫期サレル聯合軍ノ兩部侵入
ヲ豫退シテシマツテ置カテケレバナラナイト答ヘタ
ソレニ對シテ、貴元氏ハ自分ノ意見デハ斯様ナ宣言
ヲスルニハソノ時デハ恐ラクモウ通過ギルデアラカ
ト答ヘタ。

カワハラ / KAWAHARA / ノ語ハ以上ノ通り。

外務大臣ト此ノ會議ニツイテ貴下ヨリ來ダ報告ニ據
セズ、貴元ノ提議立ビニ貴下ノ返答ニ對シ詳細報告サ
レタシ。

/ VON RIBBENTROP /
フオシ。リッペントロップ